「クリュシッポス『論理学研究』」残欠考
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In the history of Philosophy there amounts to a considerable number of philosophers who has a book named Logical Investigations among their works. The list of such authors is neither completed without mentioning Husserl and Frege near to the end, nor starts without Chrysippus on the top. His Logical Investigations, Λογικα Ζητηματα, assumed to be identical with the work listed in Diogenes Laertius (VII-198) under the title of 'Ζητηματων εννεα και τριακοντα, is unfortunately preserved in quite unsatisfactory condition, now classified as P. Here. 307, which was found and rescued from the ruin of a private library of former Epicurean κηπο&b.sigmav; of Herculaneum. It seems to be strange that the Stoic book was found in the Epicurean library. But we know early Epicureans wrote books against Plato's earlier dialogues to criticize Socrates, who was treated as a paradigm by their stoic rivals. So mainly for the critical concerns, the Epicureans contain Chrysippus' work among ones of other schools including Academics in their library, so-called 'Villa dei Papiri'. This work as a whole, we suppose, concerns various types of ambiguities (αμφιβλιαι) in linguistic activities, if not the sole theme of it. In this paper I concentrate my discussions on the 12th column of it and propose its new reading B. Inwood characterizes it as dealing with 'ambiguous commands' such as 'Do x or if not doy'. But I think it is not simply ambiguous commands that the column is concerned with, but ambiguities of disjunctive commands-and the ambiguity covers disjunction as well as commands themselves. Before going on to my proposal, we need some preparations. The disjunctive command which we find at the 13th column takes such a form as 'Either walk or sit(η περιπατει η αθου)'. And there is also an ambiguity and it suggests two different interpretations of the disjunctive command- (i) one component of it is canceled from the initial command, or (ii)the disjunction as a whole is under the command. And in the latter case, the disjunctive form is changed into that of 'Walk, or, if not, sit(περιπατει ει δι μη, καθου)'. Why?-we use interchangeably 'or' and 'unless' to express the same disjunctives without altering the truth-value from the propositional logical point of view. According to Galen(Inst. Log., 3. 4. 1), the hypothetical forms in Peripatetic logic are divided into two types, κατα συνεχειαν and κατα διαιρεσιμ which correspond to Stoic ones of συνημενον αξιωμα (ει p, q) and διεζευγμενον αξιωμα(ητι p η q). This explains why, not η-connectives, but ει-connectives put the two components of a disjunction, not separately, but as a whole, under the commands. Because the former offers a choice but the latter presents an alternative-this suggests the command in the case of the latter turns out to be a persuasion or a counsel rather than a command in a strict sense. The word 'a persuasive predicate (κατηγορημα πιθανον)' (single, not plural)used to characterize a disjunctive infinitive 'to walk, or, if not, sit(περιπατειν, ει δε μη, καθησθαι)' vindicates this. And these discussions show strikingly curious resemblance to ones which were commenced between B. A. 0. Williams and P. T. Geach on 'imperative inference' in early 60's. Now we move back to the 12th column. At 11. 15-6 of the column, I propose to read κατηγορηματο&b.sigmav;...ουθ' ενο&b.sigmav; rather than ουθαμηι taken by Hulser following von Arnim. Accordingly, at 11. 16-7, I read ουθ' εν rather than ουθεν to make it as a complement i.e. 'nor as one thing' to 'such and such a state of affairs(τοιουτο πραγμα)'. And I make γαρ to γ' αρ' only by changing its articulation, just like the case of ονθ' εν. So we translate the whole sentence as '...for example, "Walk, or, if not, sit"...for all things are put under the command, but they could neither partake in one predicate, nor, therefore, show such a state of affairs like "this man walks, or, if not, he sits" as one thing'. We could not understand ουθεν...εμφαινειν to mean 'Car la phrase indicative "celui-ci se promene, mais sinon il est assis" n'a pas de contenu.'[pace Pachet(1978)367]or 'Denn eine Sache wie "Dieser geht spazieren ; wenn aber nicht, dann sitzt er" besagt nichts.'[pace Hulser FDS 827]. Once B. Inwood commented as follows ; 'We do not find the terminology which might correspond to the idea of assertoric mode operators, although the discussion of predicates and imperatives in the Logical Investigations of Chrysippus encourages me to suspect that elsewhere in his now lost logical works he may have employed such terminology.'[EHA 94]But in the above discussions, Chrysippus used the word υπο την προσταξιν πιπτειν. And it is what Inwood was looking after. In this respect, Chrysippus is entitled a precursor of Frege. So, if my proposal of reading is right, the following part of the column shows that of two senses of the disjunctive commands-i.e. alternativepresenting commands(or rather, counsels) and choice-offering ones-the former turns out to be a optional ordered pairs in the infinite sequence of the preferable alternatives. We understand 'Do this, or, if not, do this' as a abridged optional command of such a longer sequence as 'First of all do this, or , if not, do this, if not, do this,...and so on(μαλιστα μεν ποιει τουτο, ει δε μη, τουτο ποιει, ει δε μη, τουτο...)'. Although some scholars deny deliberations within the framework of the Stoic theory of action, I think this makes a room for a Stoic version of it. Because for Stoics rational impulse (ορμη) is a self-command and if the former type of disjunctive commands is also applied to agents themselves, it must be the Stoic deliberation. That is a reason why the Stoics, though queerly enough for us, include μαλλον...η) ...and ηττον... η...among the sentence connectives like conjunctions, conditionals and disjunction in Diogenes Laertius (VII 72-3). Lastly I suggest that, to use Chrysippus favorite example, "Περιπατει, δι δε μη, καθου επι τη&b.sigmav; Στοα&b.sigmav;", my translation of which is 'Be Peripatetic, or, if not, stay in the Porch', still stands as an unnegligible counsel, if not command, for today's philosophers of action.
- 日本西洋古典学会の論文
- 1997-03-10
日本西洋古典学会 | 論文
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- クセルクセスの遠征軍の規模
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