質料としての生きている身体 : アリストテレス『デ・アニマ』における形相-質料理論
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In De Anima II 1 Aristotle applies the form/matter distinction to the soul-body relation and introduces what J. Ackrill calls the "homonymy principle", according to which a dead body is not a body, except homonymously, that is in name. Ackrill argues that this account is infelicitous, because the homonymy principle suggests that a body cannot exist without soul, though Aristotle's hylomorphism requires that matter could be regarded as existing without form. In this paper I will attempt to show that this difficulty stems from understanding Aristotle's hylomorphism exclusively on the basis of the model of artifacts, and that it is not necessary in hylomorphism that "the matter can be picked out in such a way that it could be conceived as existing without the form," as Ackrill says. Aristotle introduces the homonymy principle to clarify the sense in which soul is essence. He explains it by an example of an instrument, i. e., an axe, and says that the essence of an axe is its function, without which it would not be an axe except homonymously. But he implies that the example of an axe is not appropriate because an axe is not a natural thing, and says soul is "logos of a certain kind of natural body having within itself a source of movement and rest." Aristotle thinks the distinction between natural things (esp. living things) and artifacts is relevant to the form/matter relation. In the case of living things the matter, which is said to have within itself a source of movement and rest, cannot be independent of the form, and must be conceived only as already having potentiality to realize a particular activity. Such matter is a kind of proximate matter, as different from that which is required in the analysis of change. Aristotle says the body as matter is "potentially such as to live," and on the other hand regards it as that which[actually]possesses soul. Why does he say so? In Metaphysics 8 he distinguishes two kinds of δυναμι&b.sigmav;(potentiality), i. e., dunamis related to movement, and dunamis related to energeia. The former has its end outside itself, and in its completion what has the dunamis acquires a new property. The latter has its end in its actuality itself, and in its completion what has the dunamis continues to be the same. This dunamis and its actuality is the same being. The body as matter is potentiality in the latter sense, and therefore it can be said to live potentially, even if it lives actually. This makes it possible that the soul itself is said to be not only a formal cause but a final cause, whereas the final cause of an artifact is outside itself(e. g., a user of an instrument). The body as matter is the heterogeneous parts of living things. Each part can be called so only in relation to the whole, which is specified by form. The matter is not in itself a definite thing, and we must refer to its form to identify it. Therefore the body is said to exist potentially, even if it manifests its own dunamis as a part of the living thing as a whole. Aristotle often explains the concept of matter by examples of artifacts, which are useful to clarify the distinction between form and matter. But it does not follow that in Aristotle's hylomorphism matter is always contingently enformed. In the case of a living thing, its matter must be a particular kind of matter, which is already directed toward a particular activity. In general matter must not be conceived as a thing which is identified in itself, and it is that aspect of a thing which can be understandable only in connection with its form, which clarifies an organized unity of the thing.
- 日本西洋古典学会の論文
- 1995-03-10
日本西洋古典学会 | 論文
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