Completeness-Incompleteness : アリストテレス実体論によせて
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Republic VII makes a point that a finger appears big or small from different viewpoints, though it always shows itself as a finger. It is because 'big' and 'small' are incomplete predicates. Likewise, anything that is beautiful is subject to be ugly. It does not have the identity of beauty. According to the theory of paradigm, what should be called the very beauty is found in another world. The paradigm of beauty is the only and proper bearer of the name 'beauty'. The 'beautiful' in "The beauty itself is beautiful" is to be different in meaning from that of the many beautiful things in this world(otherwise it would be faced with The Third Man). However, to transform the incomplete predicates into complete ones is to put pressure forcibly upon the language from outside the language. The terms which naturally contain completeness are substantial ones such as 'finger' and 'man'. The analysis of inherence in Categoriae shows that the names and their παρωνυμα of non-substantial terms are complementary. When we use a predicate 'white' for Socrates, we mention that white inheres in Socrates. Therefore Socrates can contain the opposites, such as white and black, bigness and smallness. At the same time the white itself does not exist, that is, there is no such white as is independent of the context in which 'white' is predicated of something. 'White' can be used, without any difference in meaning, on two levels of particulars and universals ; "This rabbit is white." and "Rabbits are white." In this case 'white' does not identify but only characterizes rabbit(s). 'Animal' is also used indifferently on either level; "Socrates is an animal." and "Man is an animal." Genus has a wider application than species. 'Man', however, has only one-level-use in the strict and proper sense; "Socrates is a man." This is because 'man' identifies an individual and reveals it as a man. What we see when we say "Socrates is white", can only be described in termsof the resemblance between Socrates' white and the examples of white(eg. snow,. rabbit, chalk, etc.). In this case we do not require the answer to What is white. But what we recognize when we say "Socrates is a man", can only be expressed in the light of What is a man rather than by appealing to the examples of man (eg. Plato, Aristotle, etc.). Prior to the introduction of any viewpoints, presuppositions or conditions, we conceive and identify individuals in their essential individualities by means of substantial terms.
- 日本西洋古典学会の論文
- 1976-03-31
日本西洋古典学会 | 論文
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- クセルクセスの遠征軍の規模
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