実体と内属性 : アリストテレス『範疇論』における二つの述語をめぐって

概要

論文の詳細を見る
In the Categories (1^a20-^b9, 2^a12-^b6, etc.), Aristotle makes a contrast between (1) καθ' υποκειμενου λεγεται (is said of a subject) and (2) εν υποκειμενω εστι (is in a subject). But why does he use λεγεται (is said) in (1), and εστι (is) in (2)? Aristotle is making an inquiry into the field of ordinary language, or rather actual language: while in (1) both τουνομα (the name) and ο λογο&b.sigmav; (the definition) are explicitly presented as the predicate (κατηγορειται) , in (2) neither the name nor the definition is presented as the predicate except some incidental coincidence of word formation (2^a27-34). We may adequately call (1) Predication and (2) Inherence. Later, (1) will develop to be the substantial predicate and (2)to be the accidental predicate; and Inherence ought to be present as predicate in some form in actual language. Making Inherence predicative results from παρωνυμα (the derivation from the name). That is, in (1), the name and the definition of substance are identically related, as being homonymous (ομωνυμα 1^a1-6) or synonymous (συνωνυμα 1^a6-12). On the other hand, the inherential predicate presents itself in actual language as nothing but η κατα τουνομα προσηγορια (addressing on the basis of the name). This name, however, is not set up through abstraction or induction of those addressings, but, from the view point of the actual use of language, must be preceded by the name. This name, being different from that in the case of substance, appearsonly as the classifying language in actual language, its definition showing "what it is" does not turn up in actual language. If one dares to look for that, one is to go beyond the level of actual language.
日本西洋古典学会の論文
1975-03-29

著者

井上忠
東京大学

実体と内属性 : アリストテレス『範疇論』における二つの述語をめぐって

スポンサーリンク

概要

著者

関連論文

スポンサーリンク