『パイドン』99e-100aのロゴスについて
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概要
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(I) In Phaedo 99e 4-100a3(shown in the letter E hereafter)Socrates adopts the method of "studying things in words(logos)" instead of that of "studying things in facts(ergon)" in the inquiry for causes. Socrates puts it in this way: "I hypothesize in every case the logos that I judge to be most powerful." It should be noted that this beginning part of the famous passage on the hypothetical method (100a3-9, shown in the letter A hereafter) is intended as the explanation of that method of "studying things in words." According to one influential intepretation (R. Robinson, R. Hack forth, N. Gulley) , the logos in A means a proposition and the logos in E is loaded with the same meaning as in A. And owing to their common assumption that the virtue of the hypothetical method lies in the mere formal analysis of propositions, their interpretation is fated to have its difficulty. The fact is that Socrates says A to explain E, so I have come to the conclusion that the logos in A is just synonymous with the logos in E in the light cast from the logos in E. Hence the first point of this paper is to point out the difficulty of defining the logos in A in terms of the logos in E, following what Socrates says. To refute their interpretation in this way, we must understand correctly the implication of the comparison of the two methods of "studying things" in E, one of which is by observations based on sense-experience and the other is by reasoning about logical relations of concepts or propositions. The crucial point is why Socrates thought a world of words to be more reliable than that of facts as to where Forms should be inquired for. The reason I put up for it is this. When a thing appears F(e. g. large, beautiful, good) , we cannot think that there lies in a world of facts some quality or relation that strictly corresponds to the word 'F'. We must trace the cause of this appearance to the very utterance of the word 'F', which never copies a fact, but operates ante rem. So the point of the comparison is not just a simple juxtaposition of the two methods, but rather the contention that the method of "studying things in words" is logically prior to that of "studying thing in facts", since the existence of so-called facts depends on certain kind of words. Due to the lack of this point, it follows from their intepretation that the logos hypothesized in A is compatible with the hypotheses derived from the "studying things in facts", such as "soul is an attunement" or "justice is repaying one's debt". Thus I conclude that the logos in A is nothing but that in E in significance and translate both logoi by 'word'. (II) These considerations lead us to the following conclusions about the Theory of Forms as Paradeigma. (i) To interpret the hypothesis "There is something beautiful itself by itself" (100b5-6, shown in the letter B herafter)as referring to an objective reality ante verbum is to stand at the antipodes of the Socratic method of "studying things in words." For the Socratic method assumes there is no objective, identifiable reality ante verbum. (ii)To assume that Form F is the criterion of the meaning of the word 'F' is also to miss the point of the Socratic method. For the rejected method of "studying things in facts" assumes that in the realm of facts is there some quality or relation that functions as the criterion, and Socrates showed this assumption leads to perplexities. So the hypothesis in B does not state that there is a Form ante verbum which functions as that criterion. In Phaedo Forms are introduced primarily not as criterions but as causes (aitia) how we allow facts to come into existence by uttering certain kind of words. Therefore the hypothesis in B should be understood as the basic postulation in terms of which we must admit absolute utterance of certain words, and furthermore, the inquiry for Forms must be made in a world of such words itself if we want the inquiry to get started.
- 日本西洋古典学会の論文
- 1981-03-30
日本西洋古典学会 | 論文
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- クセルクセスの遠征軍の規模
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