アリストテレスにおける 「不動の原理」と「第一の実体」
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In order to understand 'the first substance'(πρωτη ουσια)in Corpus Aristotelicum, many scholars have mainly discussed the passage of 'individual' in Cat. ch. 5, and 'form' in Met. Z. But it is necessary to stress the importance of the examples of 'the unmovable principle' in Met. A as the object of 'the first philosophy'. It is clear, from the contexts of 'the first substance' in Met. Γ. 1005a33-b2, K. 1064b9-14 and the related contexts in Met. E, Γ, K, that 'the knowledge concerning a whole region of substances' is 'the first philosophy', and that it is 'the first substance' that is the central object of this knowledge. And 'the first substance' in this sense is neither 'individual' nor 'form', but 'separable and unmovable substance'. Here are the related examples of 'the first substance' in this sense. I a.(Met. A. 6, 7): Substance which is 'simple and concerning the state of realization' (1072a30-32). This substance means 'the first unmovable mover'. And 'the state of realization'(ενεργεια)in this passage is opposed to 'the state of movement' (κινησι&b.sigmav;) , which is especially represented by 'the perpetual circular motion'. b.(Met. A. 8): 'The first and unmovable substance'(1073a30)and the mover which moves the outermost planetary heaven(1073b1-3). They describe not only 'the first unmovable mover', but in detail, also plural 'unmovable substances and principles' (1074a15). II.(De Caelo I. 3): 'The first body'(270b21)or 'αιθηρ'. It is natural to suppose that Aristotle is not clearly aware of 'the unmovable principle' from this standpoint, for 'the first body' shows the circular motion by itself and no outer principle is required. It is quite natural to date these three standpoints in the order of II ⇒ Ia ⇒ Ib. And the central thought about 'the unmovable principle' is especially represented by the standpoint la, and it is clear that the fundamental view of the standpoint la in Met. A is also found in other chapters of Metaphysics and in other books. With these points in mind, we can also point out the mutual relation among the first substances. For example, 'the first substance' as 'form' in Met. Z (1037a5, 28) is neither 'man' nor 'animal'(i. e. 'the second substance' in The Categories) , but 'soul'(φυχη). And in connection with this point, we must take notice of the fact that 'the separable and unmovable substance' is called 'intellect'(νου&b.sigmav;)in Met. A(1072b20, 23, 1074b15, 21, 1075a4). As a result of what has been said, Met. A does not show an isolated thought of the early period, but in some sense, it indicates the essence of the whole of Metaphysics. It seems reasonable enough to suppose that 'the first substance' is described flexibly according to each subject. And we can also clearly point out that 'the first substance' as the object of 'the first philosophy', is closely connected with 'the unmovable principle' which means 'intellect' and 'the state of realization'.
- 日本西洋古典学会の論文
- 1994-03-28
日本西洋古典学会 | 論文
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- クセルクセスの遠征軍の規模
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