高校入学機会の配分と選抜過程の「市場化」 : 埼玉県入試改革のゲーム理論的考察

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概要

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• Despite banishing mass marketed tests from common schools in 1990s many students still participate in them at their own expense in Saitama. Although the loss of mass tests made the career guidance in common schools difficult, the vendor of the tests continues to make many people cooperate for reconciliation of interests before the entrance examinations of private school. According to the analysis based on the game theory this is because education as a positional good encourages people to cooperate. In conclusion marketization of distribution of education not only as a public good but also as a positional good can cause social injustice and inequality.

• 2008-03-10

著者

• 澤里 翼

  東京大学大学院教育学研究科学校開発政策コース

関連論文

• 高校入学機会の配分と選抜過程の「市場化」 : 埼玉県入試改革のゲーム理論的考察

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