Optimal Internal Pricing and Capacity Planning for Service Facility with Finite Buffer

スポンサーリンク

概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• A general microeconomic model is developed for exploring optimal internal pricingand capacity planning for service facility with finite buffer capacity. Because of thelimited buffer capacity, jobs finding buffer full upon their arrival would be rejected. Such rejections create a gap between the value collectively perceived by users and the actual achievement of the organizational value. This gap, called the loss externality, has never been studied before and plays an important role for designing optimal pricing scheme. In general, the underlying economic structure may involve multiple equilibria and it is unclear whether or not the system can be controlled through internal pricing.In this regard, a sufficient condition is given under which the system administrator can and two separate prices for accepted and rejected users at any demand level to bedesired so that the desired demand level becomes the unique equilibrium of the system. For a short-run problem, it is shown that the optimal pricing scheme can be expressed as the sum of the usual congestion externality and the loss externality. For a long-run problem, the optimal pricing scheme is expressed in a unified manner so that the structural relationship between the short-run problem and the long-run problem at optimality can be readily observed. A necessary and sufficient condition is also given for the marginal capacity pricing to be optimal, i.e. the optimal long-run pricing consistsof the marginal cost for processing capacity and the marginal cost for buffer capacity without involving any externality at all.

• 国際大学の論文

著者

• Masuda Yasushi

  Keio University

• 増田 靖

  慶應義塾大学

• Masuda Yasushi

  An Associate Professor Of Administration Engineering Faculty Of Science And Technology Keio Universi

• Masuda Yasushi

  Faculty Of Science And Technology Keio University

• Sumita Ushio

  Dean Of Graduate School Of International Management International University Of Japan Niigata Japan

• Yamakawa Shigetaka

  a senior research fellow at IUJ ARIS-F Software R&D Center (IAC) in International University of Japa

• Yamakawa Shigetaka

  A Senior Research Fellow At Iuj Aris-f Software R&d Center (iac) In International University Of

• Masuda Y

  Keio University

関連論文

• SECOND-BEST CONGESTION PRICING AND USER HETEROGENEITY IN STATIC TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS
• Management Scienceの近年の動向とモデル化に関する私見 (特集 ゲーム理論とその周辺)
• Management Science の近年の動向とモデル化に関する私見
• STOCHASTIC COMPARISONS IN REVENUE MANAGEMENT UNDER A DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
• 大規模な発電機起動停止計画問題のための遺伝的アルゴリズムに基づく解法
• 離散的構造を持つ空間競争モデルにおけるBertrand-Nash均衡解の計算(ゲーム(1))
• Hub-Spoke型ネットワークにおける費用負担問題について(ゲーム理論(2))
• ネットワーク均衡モデル上における2つの企業の合併効果について(ゲーム)
• セカンドベストな混雑課金に関する一考察(都市・交通(5))
• 携帯電話の料金設定に関する一考察(マーケティング(1))
• Editorial Introduction : A Special Issue on "Network Design, Control and Optimization"
• Optimal Internal Pricing and Capacity Planning for Service Facility with Finite Buffer
• A COMPOUND DEPENDABILITY MEASURE ARISING FROM SEMI-MARKOV RELIABILITY MODEL
• 推移確率が行列幾何構造をもつ2変数マルコフ連鎖について(待ち行列(2))
• 米国プロフェッショナル・スクール事情
• An efficient unit commitment schedule by combining of continuous relaxation method and genetic algorithm (特集 光・量子場が関わるナノサイエンステクノロジー)
• EVALUATING ALL BERTRAND-NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A DISCRETE SPATIAL DUOPOLY MODEL
• TRANSIENT PROBABILITIES OF HOMOGENEOUS ROW-CONTINUOUS BIVARIATE MARKOV CHAINS WITH ONE OR TWO BOUNDARIES
• 4.イールドマネジメント(サービスイノベーションへの数理的アプローチ)
• 2-F-9 関係的契約による二重限界化の解決 : 景気変動がある場合(ゲーム理論(2))
• 1-E-4 クールノー複占市場における競合企業へのライセンス供与契約(ゲーム理論)
• 1-E-3 戦略的な消費者に対する生産方式(ゲーム理論)

もっと見る 閉じる

スポンサーリンク