ユーロシステム下の金融の安定性再考

概要

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Financial instability in the 1990s, as experienced in Japan and Sweden as well as in East Asia, may give some lessons for Europe to manage their potential financial crises in the near future. This paper examines the unfinished agenda of the institutional design for financial stability in Europe. Increasing integration in the EU gives rise to cross-border spill-over effects or externalities. The present system of financial supervision by the NCBs does not incorporate these externalities. What is the best way to choose an appropriate model for Europe? Responding to the trend of cross-sector integration, two main models have emerged: a functional model (separate supervisors for prudential supervision and conduct of business) and an integrated model (a single supervisor). It will also review the theoretical foundations of prudential policy which inspired the institutional design of financial safety nets. Finally, we explore the appropriate combination of cooperation among national supervisors and minimal centralization for improving the financial stability.