企業統治と支配のメカニズム

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• China is in the transitional stage from planned economy to market economy, and the biggest problem of transition economy is the system conversion of the state-owned enterprises. In 1993, The Chinese government set up a policy targeting mainly reforming the stock system of the state-owned enterprises to "establish a modern company system". Since then the research on state-owned enterprise's corporate governance has become a very important subject. This paper discusses the change and the problems of the state-owned enterprise's governance structure in the stock system reform process. Through the stock system reform, most companies established a corporate governance mechanism, and, as a result, the role of board of directors is gradually becoming important. However, there are some problems. First, in many companies, their government supervisory section still participates in the corporate management, and is holding the manager's rights of personnel management. Next, the ratio of national stock is high, the degree of concentration of these stocks to the largest stockholder is high, and there are many internal graduate persons ;these facts mean the tendency of "insider control" in the board of directors. Finally, the party secretary of a company holds simultaneously the post of board-of-directors' chairman. Hence his influence in board of directors is strong. In order to solve the above-mentioned problem, formation of a competitive market environment, change of the possession structure of stocks such as diversification of stocks, and functional change of the party organization are required.

• 島根県立大学の論文

著者

• 唐 燕霞

  島根県立大学総合政策学部

関連論文

• 企業統治と支配のメカニズム
• 江蘇省の株式制改革から見た中国国有企業の企業統治
• 計画経済期の国有企業 : 社会学の視点からの考察
• 市場経済移行期における : コーポレート・ガバナンス : 中国国有企業の統治メカニズムの構築にむけて

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