航空におけるディレギュレーション(産業,日本企業の将来とその役割-日米構造協議の問いかけるもの-)
スポンサーリンク
概要
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One of the important themes taken up in the Japan-U. S. Structual Impediments Initiative talks was doubts entertained by the U. S. side, in connection with the international closedness of the Japanese markes, regarding the realities of competition and the way in which the government exercised control in the markes. This paper, taking up the recent situation of the civil aviation marked, keeps track of the realities of the relaxation or abolition of governmental control over civil aviation in the U. S. and Japan, examining effectiveness of the contestable market theory. The U. S. deregulation of civil aviation, which started in 1978, has induced active new entries into the air transport market, given rise to the withdrawal of many defeated airilnes through unprecedentedly severe competition, and accelerated concentration in the market. At the same time, the intensified competition brought down the level of effective air fares by as much as 28% and doubled the number of air passengers in the period from 1978 to 1986. Intensified competition had been feared to adversely affect safety, but as far as statistical figures indicate, the rate of actual air accidents was almost halved during the period under review. In Japan, the so-called "1970-72 civil aviation constitution" was abolished and the government policy was reoriented toward deregulation from 1985 to 1986. Competition was promoted by encouraging more than one carrier to operate on the same domestic route letting plural airlines to serve international routes, privatizing Japan Airlines, along with some increase of flexibility in pricing. For the moment, however, the limited capacities of such key airports as Haneda and Itami are tightly restricting any further increase in the number of flights, or in available service, and the realization of effective competition is considerably delayed. In the context of discussing effectiveness of the contestable market theory in the civil aviation sector, the economies of scale afforded mainly by large CRSs and the sunk cost character of the investment made in them are undeniably contributing to keeping the actual barrier to new entrants fairly high. Moreover, the constraints posed to smaller airlines in raising the large sum of capital required for installation of large efficient CRSs and for development of service networks extensive enough to secure the economies of scale cast a fundamental doubt about the possibility of ensuring effective working of the pressure of new entries against the monopolization of profits by large companies, which the contestable market theory presupposes.
- 日本大学の論文
- 1991-11-25