インセンティブ・システムとしての日本型経営 : その独自性と問題点
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概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
The New incentive system we consider here represents an attempt to incorporate "God's invisible hand" into the internal organization of private firms as well as public enterprises. The new incentive system intends (1) to activate the supply-side of the economy, (2) to solve the problem of what is called in the public choice literature, the prisoners' dilemma (i. e., to transform such a problem into the realm of the problem governed by "God's invisible hand"), and (3) to eradicate the X-inefficiency proposed and popularized by H. Leibenstein. Through such effects, not only is productivity growth stimulated, but also contributions are made to the stabilization of the employment and the price level. The so-called Japanese management system possesses certain advantages as an incentive system to promote the growth of productivity and to stabilize the macro-performance of the economy as measured by the employment and the general price level. To put it differently, this system has a built-in structure of enhancing the capital-labor ratio (k), technology (t), and the intensity of labor effort (z), which is critically influenced by the state of employer-employee cooperation, competitive pressure, etc. The critical factor for our analysis is that these are the major determinants of the labor productivity (y), whose relation can be succinctly described as y=f(k, t, z), where f_K>0, f_t>0, and f_z>0. The following points can be raised as specific features of the Japanese management system. First of all, in large manufacturing firms, where the life-time employment system is typically practiced, since wages are determined not to maximize laborer's labor share in the short run but to maximize, rationally enough, the life-time income of the workers, the laborer's share is kept low, at least compared with other advanced countries, and, as a result, the disputes over the income distribution between the empoyer and employees are largely mitigated. Secondly, for the same reason as above, the investment in innovation and on-the-job training, which are key factors to bring about technological progress, are greatly facilitated. Under the practice of life-time employment, and the system of a rising scale of wages, it appears that resistance to innovation, which tends to make existing technology obsolete, is minimized. Thirdly, the work incentive of the employees is kept fairy strong owing to the constant thread of the competition between employee groups as well as the integrating force within groups. With respect to the dark side, it must be pointed out that the Japanese management system sometimes results in (1) distributional unjustice (i. e., a lower growth rate of real wages rather than real productivity growth and a substantial wage differential between large-scale and medium-sized enterprises), (2) the almost regular practice of frequent forced over-time and of giving-up paid holidays, and (3) the demand-supply gap at the macro-level due to slower growth rate of disposable wage income in real terms as compared to the growth rate of the whole economy.
- 日本大学の論文
- 1986-03-20