合理的行為者モデルによるEU拡大分析 : 構成主義的分析による合理モデル批判を受けて
スポンサーリンク
概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
This article analyzes the EU's eastward enlargement in the post-Cold War era using the rational actor model (RAM). The RAM is an assumption that the actor makes the decision of his behavior by considering the cost-benefit calculation. Graham Allison asserts "If a nation or its representatives performed a particular action, that action must have been selected as the value-maximizing means to achieve the actor's objectives", while the constructivist, Frank Schimmelfennig insists that in order to explain the EU's case, the international norm and the political value is more useful than the cost-benefit analysis. The object of this article is to demonstrate that the RAM is suitable for understanding the EU's case by adding the political cost-benefit to the rational model. The EU accepted ten central and eastern European countries (CEECs) as new members in May, 2004. In the 80s, the EC offered development assistance (structural policy) on the occasion of expansion to Southern Europe in order to narrow the economic gap between Southern Europe and EC member nations. If the EU applies such structural policy based on the present standard to CEECs as well, it will become far more indispensable than for South European countries. The CEECs' average GDP per capita was 46.4% (weighted average value by purchasing power parity) of the EU average in 2001. When the common agricultural policy (CAP) is applied to CEE in such economic conditions, the expenditures for CEECs -including Poland, which has a huge agricultural sector-will amount to an annual 11 billion ECU (by the European Commission's calculation), and will greatly press the EU financially. Why has the EU aimed at eastward expansion, even at such financial cost? In other words, how can the EU's political leaders secure "benefits" which balance the financial cost? What are the costs and benefits of the accession for CEECs? These points are the focus of this article. In order to understand the expansion strategy of the EU, analysis from the security side is necessary. Joining the EU, the CEECs not only enter into the single market of the EU, but it will cooperate with the EU in the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). CEECs' cooperation with the EU in CFSP has an important meaning for European security. Furthermore, if the regional conflict breaks out in the politically unstable CEECs, the potential costs such as military intervention, Peace-Keeping Operations, and refugee care will occur. To avoid the huge cost generated by such conflict, the eastward expansion can also be regarded as preventive diplomacy.
- 2006-03-31
著者
関連論文
- 合理的行為者モデルによるEU拡大分析 : 構成主義的分析による合理モデル批判を受けて
- 欧州における政治経済秩序の再編 : EUとNATOの拡大を中心として
- 冷戦後の欧州における安全保障秩序 : NATOの東方拡大とOSCEの展開及びEUの安全保障政策
- 経済的相互依存と安全保障戦略 : 国際政治経済学(IPE)の分析概念と冷戦期の東西貿易
- EU拡大をめぐる合理主義と構成主義の検討 : F.Schimmelfennig等による構成主義分析と合理主義の接点
- EUの東方拡大と財政改革:『アジェンダ2000』とベルリン欧州理事会を中心として
- 経済的相互依存と外交政策 : 日中関係を事例として
- EU東方拡大の政治経済学 : 安全保障戦略と拡大コストの相克