Stigma, Free-Riding, and Bank Instability

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• This paper presents a simple model of depositors' behavior when their bank faces a bankruptcy risk due to delinquent loans. It is shown that the delinquent loans could have a destabilizing effect, causing the depositors to avoid association with the bank and giving rise to a socially inefficient bank run. Possible remedies to such stigmatization (e. g. informational regulation, bail-out, and the formation of a group of "stable depositors") are also discussed.

• 大東文化大学の論文
• 2002-03-20

著者

• 古屋 核

  大東文化大学

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• Stigma, Free-Riding, and Bank Instability
• 市場の失敗と雇用格差 : 「既卒」差別と若年労働問題

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