信念の保証とモジュール問題

概要

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In this paper, I will discuss Alvin Plantinga's theory of warrant of beliefs and Mathias Steup's criticism against Plantinga in terms of module individuation. Plantinga thinks it is just one condition we need to add to true beliefs in order to get knowledge: warrant, and he proposes the analysis of warrant as follows: A belief is warranted if and only if it is produced by cognitive faculties which are (1) functioning properly, (2) reliable, (3) aimed at truth, and (4) attuned to the cognizer's environment. Steup raises the question especially on the first condition of warrant; Which module or modules of cognitive faculties should functioning properly? He shows some problematic cases which should amount to counter examples to Plantinga's analysis of warrant; he claims that Plantinga needs to develop a detailed account of faculty individuation into modules in order to override the counterexamples. Finally, it is proved that Plantinga's theory of warrant proposed in 1993 would fail to thoroughly respond to Steup's claim even though Plantinga tries to refute Steup's criticism in 95.
岩手県立大学の論文
2005-01-31