第三次近衛内閣と「帝国国策遂行要領」 : 「国策」策定の政治過程の検討

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This paper analyzes the political processes of 'Guidelines for Implementing National Policy' (Teikohu Kokusaku Suiko Yoryo) which was adopted by the Third Konoe Cabinet. During the term of the Third Konoe Cabinet, Japanese foreign policy was formulated at the Imperial Court by the Imperial Head-quarters-Government Liaison Conference (Dai-hon'ei Seifu Renraku kaigi). The decisions of this Conference were more influential than those of the Cabinet. Issues concerning National Policy (kokusaku) proposed by the Army and Navy were debated and constructed at the Liaison Conference. However, the Liaison Conference was unsuccessful in overcoming the structural flaw in the Meiji Constitution which saw legislative power shared between the Cabinet and the General Staff. The Liaison Conference could not override the Cabinet or General Staff in decision making. In cases where the interests of the various government organs conflicted, the Liaison Conference either avoided making a decision, or forwarded policies for imperial ratification that incorporated the interests of all the opposing government institutions by processes called Ryoron-Heiki. It is through these processes of compromise that National Policy was formulated. The formation of the Guidelines for Implementing National Policy is seen as the cornerstone for Japan's decision to go to war. This paper analyzes the political processes involved in the formation of National Policy. It examines the following points. 1)The political goals of the Army and Navy immediately after the establishment of the Third Konoe Cabinet. 2)The reaction of the Army and Navy towards the 'freezing' of Japanese funds in the United States by the United States Government. 3)The influence of assertions as to attacking the Soviet Union. 4) How the Army and Navy perceived the domestic and international situation when the Guidelines was first adopted. The chief aim of the Guidelines originally proposed by the Navy was to accelerate its arming against its potential enemy, the US. The summit meeting between Roosevelt and Konoe was the other dimension of the policy, as Navy Minister Oikawa was optimistic that a successful diplomatic agreement would be reached by the two leaders. The war Offlce stated that if diplomacy failed, the next step was war. The General Staff Office's position was that Japan must set a date for the commencement of war, but at the same time must persist through all diplomatic avenues available to try and reach some agreement. The stance of the Navy office was to continue to prepare its forces for war, but refuse to commit itself to a date when hostilities would commence. In the end, however, a compromise was reached with the deadline for any diplomatic solution being set for early October. This deadline was set immediately after Japanese authorities received a telegram reporting that Roosevelt was positive towards a summit meeting. Furthermore, the Navy Office was also successful in increasing the number of political procedures required in reaching a decision for war, effectively making any such decision harder to obtain. In the opinion of the Navy, a Japanese victory depended on a favourable change in the international situation. In short, the Guidelines was an ambiguous move to compromise. On one hand, diplomatic negotiations were still being pursued. On the other, preparations were being made for war. Yet, the success of either of the two objectives depended upon a change in the prevailing international situation. The inability to reach a decision led to Konoe to dissolve his cabinet in the middle of October, 1941.
1992-09-20

第三次近衛内閣と「帝国国策遂行要領」 : 「国策」策定の政治過程の検討

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