「台湾出兵」方針の転換と長州派の反対運動
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Research papers on the Formosa Incident, which was the first dispatch of troops for modern Japan, have been numerously published from the viewpoint of the diplomatic history. I don't have anything to add to these fromer achievements. But, on the problem how the dispatch was enforced, there seem not a few gross misunderstandings in the former studies. I especially take up next two points for examination. Firstly, it is said that the leaders who propelled the dispatch of troops to Formosa were Toshimichi Okubo, Shigenobu Okuma and Tsugumichi Saigo. And there were basically not any opponents among them. Secondly, Takamitsu Kido and the Choshu faction consistently objected the dispatch by Okubo from the consideration of the precedence of the domestic affairs, and Kido resigned from Sangi for that reason. These opinions are widely accepted. But when we investigate these points deeply, we come to the problem how we understand the policy of the Okubo regime toward Asia. On this point, the diplomacy of Soejima who aimed to progress rights of Japan, is said to try not only the possession of Formosa but the conquest of the whole East Asia. Former researches connected this with the dispatch of troops to Formosa and by doing so tried to make clear the policy of the Okubo regime toward Asia and its nature which was represented by its opinion to conquer Korea (or the operation of power politics such as of Prussia). Against these opinions, I came to the conclusion as a result of my own study of historical facts. The dispatch of troops to Formosa in April 1874, was different from the original plan, which was to send an envoy in order to punish and pacify natives in Formosa, who had hurt the people of Loochoo Islands and Oda Prefecture. This was decided on the proposal by Okubo and Okuma, which Kido and the Choshu faction had consented. But, while Okubo were in Kyushu to deal with the revolt in Saga, Tsugumichi Saigo was troubled by discontented Samurais of Kagoshima, and he volunteered to be the governer of Formosa. The policy to dispatch the troops to Formosa turned accordingly to aim at the possession and colonization of it. The Choshu faction regarded this conversion as the scheme to pacify the samurais of Kagoshima, so they started the opposition vigorously. Thus, Kido and the Choshu faction objected the plan of Tsugumichi Saigo but not the original plan of Okubo. Differently from the accepted theory, there was not a basic discrepancy of opinions between Okubo and Kido, the Choshu faction. As Okubo only intended to dispatch an envoy, there was a great difference in thought between Okubo and Soejima, who aimed at the possession of Formosa. So the policy of Okubo cannot easily be connected with power politics like those of Prussia and the opinion of the conquer Korea. On the contrary, the policy of Okubo toward Formosa intended to compromise the former Sangis, who resigned as the result of the political change in the 6th year of Meiji, and discontented Samurais, and rather represented the weekness of Okubo regime. It is after the negotiation with Shin-dynasty succeeded miraculously, then Okubo regime exercised a kind of power politics, still limited to the policy toward Ryukyu.
- 1983-11-20
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