クールノー複占市場と情報伝達 : 局所的な危険と危険回避
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概要
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The purpose of this paper is to generalize the results of Sakai and Yoshizumi (1989) concerning the welfare comparison between information structures in a Cournot duopoly with demand uncertainty. The previous paper has established that if the degrees of risk aversion of the firms are sufficiently large, information acquisition is not beneficial to the firms, and hence information may not be shared in equilibrium. That paper has employed several specific assumptions : the von-Neumann Morgenstern utilities are of constant risk aversion, the probability distribution of demand risk follows normality, and the demand and the cost functions are linear. This paper deals with a more general case where the utilities are twicely continuously-differentiable, the probability distribution is differentiable, and the demand and the cost functions are thirdly continuously-differentiable, but the very small risks are solely considered. It is shown that the previous results still hold in this situation.
- 帝京平成大学の論文
- 1995-04-01