A BERTRAND MODEL OF TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
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概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
We analyze environmental policy in a two country world in which national governments and polluting firms behave strategically. Two general issues are examined. First, we specify the conditions under which the pursuit of one-sided environmental policy by a country in a Bertrand game, will immiserize that country. Second, we examine the effects of pollution control by means of alternate price control instruments in a Bertrand game in which national governments care about global pollution but polluting firms do not. We find that there are reasonable circumstances in which the conduct of one-sided environmental policy is immiserizing. Next, we show that when the two countries are similar, the joint policy instrument is the most desirable pollution control instrument. However, when the two countries are dissimilar, there is no clear answer as to which control instrument is the most desirable.
- 慶應義塾大学の論文
著者
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Batabyal Amitrajeet
Department Of Economics Rochester Institute Of Technology
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XU Qing
Fraud Risk Management, American Express Cards
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Xu Qing
Fraud Risk Management American Express Cards
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- A BERTRAND MODEL OF TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
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