STABLE CARTELS WITH A COURNOT FRINGE IN A SYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY

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概要

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• We consider a symmetric cartel formation game where the cartel, once formed, acts as a Stackelberg quantity leader and the nonmember firms play the Cournot game with respect to the residual demand. We show the existence of a stable cartel under fairly general demand and cost conditions. We also compare by means of numerical examples the size of stable cartels in our model with that in the price leadership model of d'Aspremont et al.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Konishi Hideo

  Department Of Economics Boston College

• LlN Ping

  Department of Economics, Lingnan University

• Lln Ping

  Department Of Economics Lingnan University

関連論文

• STABLE CARTELS WITH A COURNOT FRINGE IN A SYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY

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