THE INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF MONETARY POLICY: A GAME-THEORETIC REFORMULATION

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概要

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• This paper reformulates the issue of the international coordination of monetary policy in the framework of an extended game with observable delay, where governments are required to set the timing of their respective actions before proceeding to the actual choice of their monetary policies. This allows to fully characterise the set of subgame perfect equilibria.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Lambertini Luca

  Dipartimento Di Scienze Economiche Universita Degli Studi Di Bologna

関連論文

• THE INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF MONETARY POLICY: A GAME-THEORETIC REFORMULATION
• INTRAINDUSTRY TRADE UNDER VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION

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