CONTESTABILITY AND BERTRAND EQUILIBRIUM: A UNIFIED APPROACH

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概要

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• NoteWe seek to unify the standard Bertrand duopoly outcome and the contestable outcome in a single model with price competition. We demonstrate that for small values of the fixed cost, the standard Bertrand duopoly outcome emerges as the equilibrium. For a large enough fixed cost, the unique equilibrium of this game yields the contestable outcome. Interestingly enough, for intermediate values of the fixed cost, duopoly outcomes may co-exist with the contestable one. Furthermore, we find that even under decreasing returns to scale a contestable outcome may exist.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Ray Chaudhuri

  Indian Institute Of Management

関連論文

• CONTESTABILITY AND BERTRAND EQUILIBRIUM: A UNIFIED APPROACH

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