THE MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSE

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概要

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• The paper analyses the implications of the Most Favored Nation Clause in the framework of two-commodity, three-country model, where each country pursues the maximization of its welfare using tariffs as instruments. The paper shows that, paradoxically a country can be better off by renouncing its freedom to choose discriminatory tariffs, because such an action may create a more favorable Nash equilibrium of tariffs. The paper also contradicts the standard presumption that the existence of the Most Favored Nation Clause is beneficial for the world economy.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Takemori Shumpei

  Agricultural Economics The Kieo Economic Society Keio University

• 竹森 俊平

  Agricultural Economics, THE KIEO ECONOMIC SOCIETY Keio University

関連論文

• THE MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSE

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