公共財,集合的選択,そして配分効率性(?)

概要

論文の詳細を見る
This article examines allocative efficiency as it is impacted by private choice versus public choice, the latter here being collective decision by majority voting rule. How do individuals decide between private versus public choice, what impact results from majority voting as the form of collective choice, and what is the allocative efficiency of both the private and public choice forms-are the three primary questions examined herein. First, a good supplied by a market such that one individual's consumption detracts from that of others is considered. Collective equal consumption of the good is assumed, and the corresponding resource allocation effects are examined. The result is that equal consumption of a private good has no resource allocation merit, except for income transfer. The type of a good used for evaluating allocative efficiency was found to be crucial, along with general difficulty doing normative analysis for a collective consumption good. Second, considering individuals who worry about losing utility by switching to collective consumption, probabilistic risk estimates by the individual including consideration of staying with private consumption as one of the alternatives are assumed. This causes the individual's demand levels for the good to be revised downward as well as decrease in collective demand. This kind of risk-considering individual tends to exit more from present collective choice as there are more various tastes for the good in any community. Third, individuals dissatisfied with collective choice who exit from the community are considered (Tiebout's "voting with one's feet"). Individuals who consider moving to other communities should regard the utility level obtained under either private or collective choice in his present community as an opportunity cost of moving somewhere else.

公共財,集合的選択,そして配分効率性(?)

スポンサーリンク

概要

論文 | ランダム

スポンサーリンク