<論文>「コミットメント, 再交渉そして不完備契約の理論」構築へ向けて : (I) 調達関係におけるコミットメントと再交渉 : 'ルールと裁量'への契約論的分析
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概要
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This paper explores the problem of commitment in and renegotiation of an initial contract, in a principal-agent model that features both price renegotiation in procurement relationships, such as the Japanese manufacturer-supplier relationship, and the ex post investment by the principal, which increase joint surplus with the agent. We show that, in the commitment and renegotiation regime practically observed in the incomplete contractual relationships, a kind of renegotiation-proof bonus scheme is endogenously generated, and it not only induces the ex ante incentive by the agent, but also provides the ex post flexibility against relatively bad states in an environment with uncertainty．
- 法政大学の論文
- 1998-07-30