カーダール政権の対外政策 : チェコ危機への対応を中心に
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概要
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It was Janos Kadar, the first secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, who grasped power after the Soviet army crushed the Hungarian people's uprising in 1956. In spite of cracking down on the opposing forces, his regime started to relax its domestic control and to introduce gradual domestic reforms. It was relations with the Soviet Union that the Kadar regime had to pay attention to in the case of the reforms. So Kadar supported Soviet foreign policy. During what was called the Prague Spring in 1968,Hungarian leaders had sympathy for Czechoslovak leaders and were skeptical about effects of the military intervention. However, they followed the Soviet decision and took part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The purpose of this paper is to examine the characteristics of Hungarian foreign policy since the mid-1960s. In particular, this study is focused on how Hungary coped with the Czech crisis. The author tries to analyze Hungarian decision-making when Hungarian economic reform and foreign policy were to face one of its most difficult problems and dilemmas. The author's paper consists of following sections : I. Introduction. II. Hungarian Reformist Course and its Foreign Policy under the Kadar Regime. III. Hungary and the Prague Spring. IV. How Hungary Coped with the Czech Crisis. V. Factors behind the Decision to Participate in the Intervention. VI. Conclusion.
著者
関連論文
- カーダール政権の対外政策 : チェコ危機への対応を中心に
- ハンガリーにおける「旧体制の復活」とナジ・イレム問題(1956-1957)
- ハンガリー外交とナジ裁判(一九五六-一九五八) : 対ユーゴスラヴィア関係を中心に
- ハンガリー危機(1956)とソ連・ユーゴスラヴィア関係
- ソ連・ハンガリー関係(1956) : ラーコシ失脚を中心に
- 冷戦期のハンガリー・オーストリア関係 1956ー1959 : ハンガリーのオーストリア政策を中心に
- ハンガリー・オーストリア間の外交文書の交換 1957-1958