Communication leading to Nash equilibrium : Game Theory (Mathematical Economics)

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

著者

• 松久 隆

  茨城工業高等専門学校

関連論文

• AWARENESS, BELIEF AND COMMUNICATION REACHING CONSENSUS (Algebraic Semigroups, Formal Languages and Computation)
• Communication Reaching Consensus through Robust Messages (Algorithmic and Computational Theory in Algebra and Languages)
• Bayesian Communication under Rough Sets Information(Algebras, Languages, Computations and their Applications)
• Core Equivalence for Economy under Rough Sets Information(Algorithmic problems in algebra, languages and computation systems)
• Welfare for Economy under Awareness (Algebra, Languages and Computation)
• Core equivalence in economy under generalized information (Mathematical Economics)
• Model-robustness of equilibrium in game for modal logics (Algorithms in Algebraic Systems and Computation Theory)
• Rationality on final decisions leads to sequential equilibrium (Mathematical Economics : Game Theory)
• Rational expectation can preclude trades (Mathematical Economics : Game Theory)
• CONSENSUS ON $p$-BELIEF COMMUNICATION (Algebraic Semigroups, Formal Languages and Computation)
• Reasoning about Dominant Actions : Logic of Decision Theory II : Game Theory (Mathematical Economics)
• Knowledge Structure in Decision Theory (Algebraic Systems, Formal Languages and Computations)
• Communication leading to Nash equilibrium : Game Theory (Mathematical Economics)
• Nash Equilibrium as Conjectures in Public Belief (Mathematical Economics)
• Logic of awareness and belief with its application to economic behavior (Languages, Algebra and Computer Systems)

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