An Adversary Model for Simulation-Based Anonymity Proof
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概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
The use of a formal method is a promising approach to developing reliable computer programs. This paper presents a formal method for anonymity, which is an important security property of communication protocols with regard to a users identity. When verifying the anonymity of security protocols, we need to consider the presence of adversaries. To formalize stronger adversaries, we introduce an adversary model for simulation-based anonymity proof. This paper also demonstrates the formal verification of a communication protocol. We employ Crowds, which is an implementation of an anonymous router, and verify its anonymity. After describing Crowds in a formal specification language, we prove its anonymity with a theorem prover.
- (社)電子情報通信学会の論文
- 2008-04-01
著者
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Kawabe Yoshinobu
Ntt Corp. Atsugi‐shi Jpn
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Kawabe Yoshinobu
Ntt Communication Science Laboratories Ntt Corporation
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Sakurada Hideki
Ntt Corp. Atsugi‐shi Jpn
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Sakurada Hideki
Ntt Communication Science Laboratories Ntt Corporation
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- An Adversary Model for Simulation-Based Anonymity Proof
- Verifying Trace Equivalence of a Shared-Memory-Style Communication System(Selected Papers from the 17th Workshop on Circuits and Systems in Karuizawa)
- Modularity of Confluence in Order-Sorted Term Rewriting Systems