N人囚人のジレンマゲームにおける規範内部化と協調の関係

概要

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In this paper, I discuss the problems of ``order in social situations using a computer simulation of iterated N-person prisoners dilemma game. It has been claimed that, in the case of the 2-person prisoners dilemma, repetition of games and the reciprocal use of the ``tit-for-tat strategy promote the possibility of cooperation. However, in cases of N-person prisoners dilemma where N is greater than 2, the logic does not work effectively. The most essential problem is so called ``sanctioning problems. In this paper, firstly, I discuss the ``sanctioning problems which were introduced by Axelrod and Keohane in 1986. Based on the model formalized by Axelrod, I propose a new model, in which I added a mechanism of players payoff changes in the Axelrods model. I call this mechanism norm-internalization and call our model ``norm-internalization game. Second, by using the model, I investigated the relationship between agents norm-internalization (payoff-alternation) and the possibilities of cooperation. The results of computer simulation indicated that unequal distribution of cooperating norm and uniform distribution of sanctioning norm are more effective in establishing cooperation. I discuss the mathematical features and the implications of the results on social science.
2006-11-01